Copyright ©  2002-2003, Jeremiah (Jerry) R. Fass.
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For comments or if you have questions contact Jerry Fass at: JFass@SkyTran.net

Transport Security and Skytran

There is a great need for security in transport, and a need for improved means to achieve and enhance it. Security may be a crucial issue, as basic as energy use or congestion, to get new transport technologies adopted in many areas of Earth. Transport has long been a magnet for crimes against goods and people. Many ancient histories, even holy writings, report road bandits and pirates. Usual transport related crimes are: theft, robbery, kidnapping, hostage taking, hijacking, assassination, terrorism, vandalism. More recently, many countries have been dealing with rising levels of transport related crimes. Modern terrorism has existed for decades or years, in many areas, such as the Middle East, Northern India, Northern Spain, Northern Ireland, and South and Central America. Since the bold September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C., there has been a great increase in the American people's awareness of security issues.

No complex system can be perfect in all ways. Any such system is a mass of design compromises, and will always have some vulnerabilities, dangers, and security problems. Thus, no transport can offer perfect, fail-safe, total security against crime and attack. But, as it is better in so many other variables, any one of which are sufficient for adoption, SkyTran, and systems like it, are inherently, radically superior in security, and less vulnerable, for goods and people, than almost any alternative form of transport, due to many physical, operational, and use traits, even as is, unmodified for security. And, if needed, these traits offer even greater options for further raising security, via added security procedures or subsystems. Together, these offer truly revolutionary gains in transport security, at bargain prices.

Why is their security so much better? For two main reasons, because they combine the best security traits of: 1) random route, random schedule systems such as cars and motorcycles, with: 2) fixed route, fixed schedule systems such as busses and trains.

One sensible approach is to consider security problems as variables and vulnerabilities. Transport has several types of vulnerabilities, causes of insecurity.

Grouping Vulnerabilities
  Problem: The main cause of insecurity, the biggest vulnerability, is often using group, communal, collective, concentrated, human operated, vehicles: ships, aircraft, trains, light rail, busses, vans. Grouping raises the need for fixed schedules and group support systems and facilities, and signatures. Grouping people together is the cause, incentive, and target, of some acts against transport (and helps spread disease). This trait allows mass hostage taking and killings. As people concentrate more, around or in stations or vehicles, they grow more inviting as targets. Consider: worse crimes, and more attacks, occur to busses than cars. Attack and mass killing risk is proportional to crowd size; higher for bigger stations and vehicles. The most efficient mass murder crimes in history used concentration camps.
  Moving groups needs higher mass systems (vehicles, tracks, stations), with more noise and vibration. When heavy systems are tampered with for crime (damaged, rigged with bombs), the systems greatly outweigh the tampering, so it is hard to sense. The signal to noise ratio is weak. Braking for damage is slow and long. Repairs are harder, and take longer, raising their effects on the system and surroundings.
  Remedies: When grouping is reduced, transport more distributed, the incentive and rationale for some crimes shrinks, because rewards for them are less. When crimes occur, effects are far smaller.
  Moving two or one users uses lower mass systems, with far less signatures, noise and vibration. When tampered with, such systems do not greatly outweigh the change, so it is easier to sense. The signal to noise ratio is far stronger. As systems weigh less, it grows more useful to instrument them with sensors to detect tampering. Braking is faster. Repairs are easier and faster, lowering their effects on travel.
  Vehicles (SkyTran) minimize grouping by being: on-demand, small, holding only two or one users, automated (no operators).
  For even more security: Cut user counts in vehicles, even to one, making smaller, less tempting targets; this also can lower energy use. Use higher strength-to-mass systems and materials (smaller targets).

This is the main reason that SkyTran, and systems like it, are more secure than alternatives, even with no special security modifications. Grouping is reduced, not prevented.

Access Vulnerabilities
  Problem: A main cause of insecurity, the next biggest vulnerability, is easy, repeated, frequent access to many vehicles, such as trains, light rail, busses, vans, trucks, cars, motorcycles, bicycles. In two parts:
  1) Ground level locations. This also makes a need to stop or turn often to avoid many other ground vehicles.
  2) Usual slowness: slow average speed, and stopping. Stopping is a case of speed = 0, and lowers average speed. All speed is relative. In two parts:
    2.1) Relative to ground.
    2.2) Relative to other vehicles, more so passing in the same direction.
  Accessibility, being on the ground, spending more time en route, moving slowly and stopping often, usually at known, predictable locations (stop signs, traffic signals, intersections; stations: bus, train, airports), or passing each other under user control, is a cause, incentive, and target, of some acts against vehicles. These traits allow access to targets and victims. As vehicles are lower, move more slowly, or stop or pass more, they allow more opportunities for crime and/or boarding, and grow more inviting as targets, and things loaded safely at the start of a trip are less likely get to the destination safely. Consider: more crimes occur to city busses than intercity busses and trains, and to ground vehicles than aircraft. Crime risk is proportional to lower altitude or speed; higher for lower or slower systems.
  Remedies: When access is reduced, vehicles are higher, faster, or stops are shorter, and fewer, and motion is more constant, the incentive and rationale for some crimes shrinks, because opportunities for them are reduced. When crimes occur, effects are less predictable and certain, as vehicles are moving.
  Vehicles (SkyTran) minimize access by being: high above ground, with track that can enter and exit buildings high up, fast, on-demand, non-stop, point-to-point, automated with no direct user motion control, no passing between vehicles moving in the same direction.
  For even more security: Use higher tracks; interface to buildings on higher floors. Go faster for lower trip times. Forbid vehicle passing. Use thinner forms with less frontal area: harder to target and hit, better ballistic deflection. Point-to-point vehicles can be sealed at trip start, unsealed at end. This is useful for moving people from one unsecure area to another, across a secure area, or the reverse, from one secure area to another, across an unsecure area: Gaza to West Bank across Israel, Pakistan to Bangladesh across India, from a poor area to another across a rich area, or between rich areas across poor areas.

Certainty Vulnerabilities
  Problem: A large cause of insecurity, a major vulnerability, is the known, predictable, fixed, unfree use traits of many vehicles: ships, aircraft, trains, light rail, trucks, busses, vans. In two parts:
  1) Spacial-Temporal, motion. In two parts:
    1.1) Fixed routes: known, certain departure, arrival points, trip paths, lines not networks.
    1.2) Fixed schedules: known, certain departure, arrival, trip times.
  2) Loads/contents. In three parts:
    2.1) Size: load mass, volume.
    2.2) Value: load worth.
    2.3) How well known: count of people knowing what loads are; avoid load signatures on vehicle.
  3) Signatures: detectable, obvious, visible traits of all vehicles, making them easier to see, target, hit. In three parts:
    3.1) Size: bigger objects: ships, aircraft, trains, light rail, busses, vans.
    3.2) Internal power: systems with large, and/or less efficient, internal energy sources (motors) emit more heat (infrared, IR) and gas emissions. Some missiles home on IR.
    3.3) Distinctiveness: unique looks, markings, signs, labels, and/or license numbers, of many vehicles, more so personal types: some aircraft, trucks; most cars, motorcycles.
  Certainty, with known, predictable, inflexible routes, schedules, loads, and/or signatures, a large distinctive vehicle, more so if it looks costly, is a cause, incentive, and target, of some acts against vehicles. These traits allow crimes to be planned more carefully, identifying and targeting vehicles, and often occupants. As vehicles have more known motion or loads, are larger, and look more unique, and costly, they attract more attention and give more opportunities for crimes, and grow more inviting as targets. Consider: bigger crimes occur to busses than cars, public aircraft than private aircraft, armored cars than normal cars, known trucks of semiconductors than unknown trucks, armored trucks than normal trucks, costly cars than cheaper ones. Crime risk is proportional to certainty, signature, value; higher for less random, more known, more distinctive, less numerous systems.
  Remedies: When certainty is reduced, vehicles use unknown routes, depart or arrive at unknown places or times, hold unknown contents, the incentive and rationale for some crimes shrinks, because opportunities for them are reduced. When crimes occur, effects are less certain and predictable, as routes, schedules, and/or contents are unknown.
  When signatures are reduced, anonymity increased, vehicles look more alike, are more numerous, or look less costly, the incentive and rationale for some crimes shrinks, because it is harder to identify them. When crimes occur, effects are less predictable and certain, as it is harder to know if the correct vehicle is targeted or hit.
  Vehicles (SkyTran) minimize certainty by being: networked, on-demand, carrying unknown loads, minimizing load related signatures.
  Minimize identifiability by being: small, externally powered, common-use, identical, with no distinctive markings to identify targets, all looking alike, more numerous, high above ground (limit access) so it is hard to see inside.
  For even more security: Have users vary/randomize trip routes, start times more; some destinations (employer, school) can aid this.
  Conceal, randomize loads.
  Cut user counts in vehicles, even to one, making smaller, more numerous targets. Make all vehicles look or be identical; never map loads, or load state, to appearance. Use camouflage: less clear targets. Shrink and/or silver or darken, or eliminate windows, so it is hard or impossible to see users inside, and if vehicles are occupied fully, partly, or are empty; these also lower cooling and heating energy needs.
  Paradoxically, the reverse is also a vulnerability.
  Uncertainty Vulnerabilities
  Problem: A large cause of insecurity, a major vulnerability, is the unknown, unpredictable, random, free use traits of many vehicles: small and private: boats, aircraft, trucks, vans, cars, motorcycles. In two parts:
  1) Spacial-Temporal, motion. In two parts:
    1.1) Random routes: unknown, uncertain departure, arrival points, trip paths, networks not lines.
    1.2) Random schedules: unknown, uncertain departure, arrival, trip times.
  2) Loads/contents. In two parts:
    1.1) Size: load mass, volume.
    1.2) Hazard: possible load danger.
  3) Signatures.
  Uncertainty, with unknown, unpredictable, flexible routes, schedules, loads, and/or signatures, is a cause and incentive of some acts using vehicles. These traits allow crimes to occur by surprise, with no notice or record, such as bank robberies, bombings, gassings; few criminals use scheduled transport to commit crimes. As vehicles have less known motion or loads, they give more opportunities to be used for crimes, and grow more inviting as weapons and accessories. Consider: more crimes occur via trucks or cars than trains or busses. Crime risk is proportional to uncertainty; higher for more random, less known systems.
  Remedies: When certainty increases, randomness is reduced, vehicles use known routes, depart and arrive at known places and times, hold known contents, have known signatures, the incentive and rationale for some crimes shrinks, because opportunities for them are reduced. When crimes occur, effects are less predictable and certain, as routes, schedules, and/or contents are known.
  Vehicles (SkyTran) minimize uncertainty during and post-trip by: easily, exactly, and cheaply measure, monitor, and record user usage (identity, time, route, vehicle); entry and exit points and times, loads. On-demand systems cannot give certainty pre-trip, one cannot know ahead of time where or when users will go; but once trips start, they can give certainty during and post-trip, where and when users have gone.
  For even more security: Do not inform riders of trip records. Add cameras to all stations, vehicles. Use special anti-crime protocols to take remote control of vehicles with suspect loads (possible bomb, people) and route them to the next portal, or any other one, or police or army bases, or security sidings, even with blast shields. Officials can quickly reach the area. Standardize and inspect loads.

Hardware Vulnerabilities
  Problem: A large cause of insecurity, a major vulnerability, is the complex, non-standard, costly hardware of many vehicles: ships, aircraft, trains, light rail, trucks, busses, vans. In four parts:
  1) Variety: simplicity, complexity of parts.
  2) Time: period to repair or replace.
  3) Cost: to repair or replace.
  Complexity, with many different components/parts, is a cause, incentive, and target, of some acts against vehicles and systems. These traits remove some reparability, add uncertainty, and allow crimes to have more impact. As systems have more, different parts, they give more opportunities for crimes, and grow more inviting as targets. Consider: worse damage occurs to varied cars than standardized cars. Crime risk is proportional to complexity; higher for more complex, varied systems.
  Remedies: When complexity and variety is reduced, systems have fewer parts, the incentive and rationale for some crimes shrinks, because effects of them are reduced. When crimes occur, effects are less severe, as damage is easier, faster to fix.
  Systems (SkyTran) minimize complexity by: fewer, more modular, uniform, standardized parts.
  For even more security: Cut part costs. Make systems simpler, more modular, uniform, standardized.

Vulnerability: Similarities, Differences
  Vulnerability to various crimes and threats are similar to each other in some ways, but different in others. Some vulnerabilities help some crimes more, some vulnerabilities hinder some crimes more. Vehicle types vary in vulnerabilities.

ABBREVIATIONS:
 G = Grouping
 A = Access
 C/U = Certainty/Uncertainty
 H = Hardware

Vehicle: Vulnerability, highest to lowest, small letters mean lesser effect

Better than Group Vehicles, Systems; and Current Personal Vehicles: Cars
  Systems like SkyTran are safer than transport via:
  1) Group vehicles, in four ways: low grouping, access, certainty (on demand); light repeated hardware.
  2) Personal vehicles, in three ways: low access, signature; for officials, can have high route, arrival, load certainty, control.

For other security related SkyTran information, see:
 http://www.skytran.net/15Faq/faq01.htm#WhySuspended
 http://www.skytran.net/15Faq/faq02.htm#DriverlessSafety
 http://www.skytran.net/15Faq/faq02.htm#Vandalism

Resource Vulnerabilities: Insecurity in the Large
Problem: A large cause of national insecurity, a major vulnerability, is the high resource and import needs of much transport. In four parts:
  1) Energy (petroleum) needs. In three parts:
    1.1) Inefficient, usually under-maintained prime movers: in most cars, trucks, busses, boats.
    1.2) High rolling resistance: rubber tires on concrete.
    1.3) Underloaded vehicles: cars, busses, trains, aircraft carrying too few users.
  2) Material: metals, plastics, parts. In the US, 1/6 of the economy is car-based, 1/60 is crash-based.
  3) Technology: complexity, expertise, licensing. More complex systems have higher needs; cars average 15,000 parts, need a vast variety of technologies.
  4) Management: often inefficient, inexpert, unprofessional. Most cars, motorcycles, are owned, operated, maintained this way.
  Large resource needs, are a cause, incentive, and target, of some acts against nations and regions. This trait allows harm to occur on a vast scale, to huge populations, holding whole economies hostage, with historic impact, as in the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks. As nations use or import more, they make more opportunities for harm, and grow more inviting as targets. Consider: in 1973/79, more problems occurred to heavy importers (Europe, US) than to more self sufficient countries (China). This risk is proportional to needs; higher for less efficient systems.
  This will grow worse in time, likely vastly so. Oil discoveries are growing smaller, and big ones rarer. Oil demand is rising, as more nations and people use more oil. In the next decade or two, world oil production may peak and then begin a long, slow decline. During or just after the production peak, if market trends do not change greatly, oil market supply/demand functions will reverse positions from their historical norms: demand will exceed supply, maybe permanently. Prices will explode. Non-Mideast world production will likely peak 5-10 years before Mideast production. If so, the Mideast will become the main world supplier of a vital, diminishing resource. Into the region, ever more money will flow for ever less product. Human governments often spend money suboptimally. Mideast governments often are violent or unstable. Sales may grow for weapons, and drugs for anxiety and depression. See: Hubbert Oil Production Peak, http://www.hubbertpeak.com/
  Resource shortages add to or cause poverty. This adds to or causes social instability, conflict, wars. Higher living standards lower poverty and related problems. Two complimentary means exist to raise living standards: 1) Get more resources: raise incomes. 2) Do more with less resources: lower costs of goods and services, directly or by shared use. More resource efficient systems aid means 2 directly, and aid means 1 indirectly.
  Remedies: When resource needs are more flexible, and use reduced, systems are simpler, the incentive and rationale for some harm shrinks, because opportunities for them are reduced. When harm occurs, effects are less predictable and certain, as nations can more easily adjust resource use. Resource producers can use less internally and have more left over to export.
  Transport (SkyTran) minimizes resources by: using less resources, of more flexible types. See works by Mohandas Gandhi, http://www.mkgandhi.org/ and Ernst F. Schumacher, http://www.schumachersociety.org/
  For even more security: Raise efficiency more, by better design. Run at slower speeds.

Psychological Vulnerability?
  If a system is constantly targeted, then crime can succeed in terrorizing users, and people can grow afraid to use it. This is one goal of terrorism. Sadly, human fear is often inversely proportional to threat. People are often very afraid of smaller dangers, and readily accept and ignore bigger ones. In the US in 2001, terrorism killed 3,500 people, cars killed 42,000, cigarettes killed 430,000, bad diet killed 1.2 million. Surveys show that people are most afraid of terrorists, least afraid of diet. With some thought this might be addressed, likely by more security monitoring, and marketing, advertising.

Thanks
  Thanks to Doug Malewicki for working so hard to find such an elegant and inspiring transport system in the vast Platonic solution space of all possible such systems. Also to Moshe Flam, for some thoughts he made clear by email, which I edited, added to, and scattered through this study.